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VAULT

Every reveal
leaves a trail.

A server-side encrypted credential vault built into the same platform as everything else — not a bolted-on Keeper or LastPass integration. Real breach checking, real key rotation, and an honest line about what “encrypted” does and doesn’t mean here.

01 — THE VAULT · SHIPPED

Six record types. One audited chokepoint.

Every reveal calls the same decrypt-for-display function, and every one of those calls writes a hash-chained audit entry. There’s no side door.

TOTP records go further still: the rotating 6-digit code is fetched freely, but the re-enrollable QR/seed stays hidden unless you explicitly ask for it — and that ask gets its own audit flag.

RECORD TYPES
Login · Secure note · API key · SSH key · Certificate · PKI key
ORGANIZATION
Nested folders, full version history, one-click restore to any prior version
REVEAL
A single decrypt-for-display chokepoint; every call writes a hash-chained audit entry, no exceptions
ACCESS
admin, technician and msp_admin only — viewer and auditor roles can’t list vault contents at all
POLICIES
Tenant vault access policies and password policies are enforced server-side, not just documented.
02 — ENCRYPTION · SHIPPED

Rotate the master key without re-encrypting a thing.

Rotating the master key re-wraps every tenant’s small data-encryption key, not the underlying secrets — a rotation that takes seconds, not a re-encryption job that takes hours.

Offboarding a tenant for good has its own path, deliberately irreversible: delete the DEK, and the ciphertext left behind is permanently unrecoverable — cryptographic shredding, not a soft delete.

ENCRYPTION
Fernet (AES-128-CBC + HMAC-SHA256) — a master KEK wraps a per-tenant DEK, which encrypts each record’s fields
KEK ROTATION
msp_admin-only endpoint; a dual-key window keeps old-wrapped DEKs decryptable during rotation; re-wraps run per-tenant, transactional, audited
CRYPTO-SHRED
Deletes the tenant’s DEK — every one of that tenant’s secrets becomes permanently unrecoverable ciphertext. Requires retyping the tenant ID to confirm, irreversible
WHAT THIS ISN’T
Not zero-knowledge — the control plane can decrypt. A deliberate, disclosed trade-off, not a hidden one
03 — BREACH CHECKING & PKI · SHIPPED

Know before your client’s ex-employee does.

BreachWatch checks vaulted passwords against Have I Been Pwned without ever sending a full password or its full hash anywhere.

Need a key pair instead of a password? Generate SSH keys or a self-signed certificate without leaving the vault, with expiry alerts before a cert quietly lapses.

BREACHWATCH
HIBP k-anonymity check — only a 5-character hash prefix ever leaves the building. Fails closed to “unknown,” never a false “safe.” Off by default
SSH KEYS
Ed25519 or RSA (2048/3072/4096), generated in-vault; the private key is never re-displayed after creation
CERTIFICATES
Self-signed X.509 (CN + SANs, 825-day default); expiry alerts at under 30 days and past-due
MIGRATION
Offline Keeper JSON/CSV import, idempotent on re-import, plus enforced portable credential importers and an audited export path. Live two-way Keeper Secrets Manager sync exists in the codebase but has not been tested against a real Keeper tenant.

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